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Abstract:  Reducing public spending was a major objective when governments across Europe 
increasingly turned to outsourcing as a mode of public service provision from the 1980s. Today, 
despite its prevalence, there is still little consensus in the literature on whether outsourcing is an 
effective policy as regards reducing spending. Using a panel data model for 25 European 
countries over the period 1990 to 2011, this article tests whether outsourcing actually led to a 
reduction in public spending. Results indicate that outsourcing failed to reduce government 
expenditures at the central government level.  This finding persists even after controlling for 
expenditure dynamics and addressing potential endogeneity issues. 
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1. Introduction 
Government outsourcing – the transfer across to non-government organizations of the 
production of goods and services previously provided within government – remains a 
popular tool of government. Indeed, governments have increasingly turned to outsourcing 
over the recent period: outsourcing accounted for over 10% of GDP across the OECD in 
2011, up from 8.5% in 2000 (OECD, 2011; OECD, 2013). Policy transfer across borders 
has intensified this trend: in the European Union (EU) increased efforts to coordinate and 
harmonise domestic policy on public services has led towards some convergence (Ferré, 
2008). In particular, the European Commission (EC) has actively encouraged European 
governments to adopt outsourcing as a form of service delivery (Warner & Clifton, 
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2014)1. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also 
supports the extension of outsourcing policies to its thirty-five members (OECD, 2007).  
Despite the increased popularity of outsourcing initiatives across the globe, there 
remain important gaps in our understanding of the dynamics of this widespread policy. 
Outsourcing has generated a vigorous, ideologically charged debate, as regards its 
benefits and drawbacks among scholars, policy-makers and international organizations. 
Outsourcing advocators claim that it induces cost savings and efficiency gains, 
particularly through the introduction of competition and the discipline of private 
ownership (Bel, Fageda, & Warner, 2010; Boardman, Vining, & Weimer, 2016). 
Governments typically justify outsourcing policies as a means to reduce overall costs to 
taxpayers. More recently, outsourcing has been justified as a part of a body of austerity 
measures during the ongoing crisis (Vaughan-Whitehead, 2013). Outsourcing has been 
presented as a means of facilitating governments’ efforts towards fiscal consolidation to 
decrease their public deficits (Anderson, Hunt & Snudden, 2014). However, it is not a 
foregone conclusion that outsourcing always generates cost savings of any kind. 
Economists, along with public policy and administration scholars, have provided a 
number of explanations for why government outsourcing may not reduce costs. In 
particular, sources of potentially greater costs for governments include the existence of 
high transaction costs, fiscal illusion problems, pressure from interest groups and negative 
externalities derived from outsourcing, such as employment reductions (Boyne, 1998a; 
Brown & Potoski, 2005; Hefetz & Warner, 2012; Sappington & Stiglitz, 1987). 
From an empirical standpoint, the precise effect of government outsourcing on 
overall public sector spending is not yet clear. The empirical literature on outsourcing is 
large, constituting a significant strand within public economics, public policy and public 
                                                          
1 See EC new rules in public procurement: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/index_en.htm 
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administration: useful reviews of the literature and meta-analyses include, Bel & Warner, 
2015; Bel et al., 2010; Domberger & Rimmer, 1994; Domberger & Jensen, 1997; Hodge, 
2000; Jensen & Stonecash, 2005; Savas, 2000, among others. However, few of these 
studies addressed the question of how cost savings resulting from outsourcing — if any 
— are passed back to the government as a whole (one exception is Alonso, Clifton, & 
Diaz-Fuentes, 2015a). Hodge (2000) reported that, of the handful of studies on this topic, 
only scant support that cost savings from outsourcing translated into reduced government 
spending. In Hodge’s (2000, p.110) words, “there is a worrying lack of evidence” 
supporting the logic that “reduced direct costs through contracts should, all other thing 
being equal, mean reduced costs overall to the government”.  
To address this gap in the literature on the effects of government outsourcing, this 
paper offers one of the first studies investigating the assumption that contracting out 
public service production results in overall lower public spending for multiple countries 
over the medium term. The paper builds on the scarce body of studies of government 
outsourcing effects on overall government spending by expanding the number of 
countries analysed, controlling for potential endogeneity problems between outsourcing 
implementation and public spending, and by controlling for expenditure dynamics. 
To do so, we borrow from the government contracting literature, and adopt an 
aggregate approach to understanding the effects of outsourcing, in order to attain a global 
perspective — at the central government level — on its effects across multiple countries. 
We assess the impact of government outsourcing on public sector spending across 25 
European Union (EU) countries2 over two decades, from 1990 to 2011, using panel data 
techniques. This aggregated approach may help to better understand the overall 
outsourcing effects despite differences found in specific cases.  
                                                          
2 The sample consists on the EU-28 countries excluding Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania due to lack of reliable data to 
construct the outsourcing indicator. 
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Our work has been facilitated by the publication of a number of new data sources. 
The previous lack of data on direct versus indirect service delivery which restricted 
research efforts (Minicucci & Donahue, 2004) has been improved with the 
implementation from the late 1990s of the System of National Accounts (SNA), as well 
as the European System of Accounts (ESA). Our study has also been facilitated by the 
OECD’s ongoing work on constructing indicators to evaluate how governments are 
performing (OECD 2011, 2013), from which we derive the outsourcing indicator.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by discussing the main 
theoretical arguments on whether, how and why outsourcing might affect government 
expenditure. Next, we describe the data and the statistical model that is used for inference. 
The fourth section reports the estimation results and interprets them. Our results suggest 
that government outsourcing was not associated with lower government expenditure, 
regardless of the model used for inference. The policy implications of this finding are 
then explored, and conclusions follow. 
 
2. Outsourcing and government spending: theoretical expectations 
The classic justifications for outsourcing is that this reduces government costs, ultimately 
making government more efficient, a key policy objective desired by all taxpaying 
citizens; however, several theoretical reasons exist which predict why this policy may or 





2.1 The null hypothesis: Government outsourcing leads to a reduction of public spending  
Two over-riding theoretical reasons explain why outsourcing should incur cost savings 
for governments: the pressure of competition and the discipline of private ownership, both 
issues extensively addressed by public choice and property rights theories (Bel et al., 
2010; Ruiz-Villaverde, Picazo-Tadeo, & Gonzalez-Gomez, 2015). Drawing on neo-
classical economics, the public choice literature critiques governments' provision of 
public services because it assumes that politicians and government bureaucrats behave 
according to the typical neoclassical individual, who seek to maximize his or her profit 
and personal interests whilst neglecting the citizens they purportedly serve (Niskanen, 
1971). In other words, bureaucrats’ behaviour might be dominated by self-interest rather 
than public service motivation or altruism. Hence, in order to redirect public officials’ 
behaviour towards public interest, a pattern of incentives and/or constraints might be 
needed (Boyne, 1998b). The solution proposed by public choice proponents consists of 
forcing previously protected, in-house activities into a new environment characterized by 
market discipline and competition amongst potential public service providers. 
Competition is, therefore, one of the fundamental ideas justifying the practice of 
outsourcing, due to the potential cost savings generated by market forces (Savas, 2000); 
the distinctive feature of outsourcing is that service contracting is performed in a special 
type of marketplace, via a competitive bidding process. Following Domberger and Jensen 
(1997, p.68), in an outsourcing scenario, the market “is defined by the contract 
specification, and the bidding process resembles an auction”. This may generate an ex-
ante competition, whereby contracted public services may be delivered at the lowest cost 
and price, resulting, a priori, in reduced government expenditures. 
A second major reason why outsourcing policies should cut costs is the perception 
that the private sector is more efficient than the public sector, a view which justified much 
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of the privatization movement (Clifton, Comín, & Díaz-Fuentes, 2006). This may be so - 
according to this line of thinking - because private firms may have greater incentives to 
innovate and cut costs (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994).  Incentives are thought to promote 
efficiency, for instance, if a manager personally benefits from improved performance, 
through company shares or salary improvements linked to efficiency gains (Andrews, 
Boyne, & Walker, 2011). Davies (1971) argued that, in the case of public 
property/management, the costs and/or benefits of a decision are less borne by the 
decision maker, unlike under a scheme of private property rights.  
On this basis, two theoretical expectations on government outsourcing effects can 
be derived from public choice and property rights models. First, spending on those public 
services exposed to competition and scheme of private property rights will decrease and, 
second, outsourcing will result in increased efficiency of public service provision. Based 
on the above discussion, it is conceivable to assume that implementing outsourcing 
policies could deliver significant reductions of government budgets. 
 
2.2 The alternative hypothesis: outsourcing may not lead to lower government spending 
The assumption that cost savings and efficiency gains are passed back to the overall 
government budget, however, could be challenged from multiple perspectives, such as (i) 
the existence of high transaction costs, (ii) fiscal illusion, (iii) common pool problems, 
(iv) pressures from interest groups and, (v) negative externalities derived from 
outsourcing policies. In what follows we aim to briefly synthetize these arguments. 
Firstly, a large body of scholars has expressed skepticism about the presumed 
advantages government outsourcing has on reduced public spending through the lens of 
transaction costs economics (Williamson, 1991; Williamson, 1999). Briefly, transaction 
costs theory focuses on different service characteristics that may block the effectiveness 
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of outsourcing policies (Brown & Potoski, 2005). Sources of potentially high costs 
associated with contracting out include asymmetric information, the management and 
supervision of contracts, “non-contractible” elements related to service delivery (such as 
in the case of confidence goods), contractual incompleteness and limited availability of 
competitive suppliers in the market (Girth, Hefetz, Johnston, & Warner, 2012; Hefetz & 
Warner, 2012; Sappington & Stiglitz, 1987; Warner & Hefetz, 2008). Following from 
this, it has also been argued that even if government contracting has positive effects over 
the short term, the potential cost savings from outsourcing may diminish or disappear 
over time by rising prices of the private sector companies due to the so-called "hold-up" 
problem (Domberger & Jensen, 1997; Williamson, 1999). When contracts are highly 
complex or incomplete, governments may need to renegotiate the contract in the case of 
an unforeseen problem or event. This not only has costs, it also gives the private firm – 
with its incentives to maximize profits – the opportunity to raise the prices it charges to 
governments (Jensen & Stonecash, 2005). If goods or services are contracted out over the 
long-term, governments may irrevocably lose their capabilities as provider, increasing the 
bargaining power of the private provider(s).  
A second potential source of adverse effects of government outsourcing policies 
on public spending is that outsourcing may generate some kind of fiscal illusion (Payton 
& Kennedy, 2013).  Briefly, fiscal illusion may arise when citizens overestimate the 
benefits of public spending and underestimate the costs of taxation (Buchanan & Wagner, 
1977; Wagner, 1976). In our case, outsourcing may hide the real costs of private service 
delivery from the public, particularly in a high transaction costs scenario. These hidden 
costs may result in a form of fiscal illusion which may support excess government 
spending since outsourcing policies might reduce the perceived price of public service 
delivery to citizens. Therefore, as a response to a potential perception of more efficient 
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provision of public services, citizens/voters may increase their demand for public 
services, thus increasing government spending. 
Closely related to the fiscal illusion approach is the idea that outsourcing may not 
necessarily reduce the size of the resource pool controlled by central governments 
(Benson, 1990). Following this logic, any expenditure savings from outsourced services 
are likely to be retained and reallocated within the government budget, since public 
officials are believed to respond to “budget maximizing” incentives. The upshot might be 
that spending on those services still controlled by the government could rise as a result of 
outsourcing (Boyne, 1998b), undermining, therefore, any overall cost savings derived 
from outsourced services. 
Another strand of the literature on government outsourcing supports the view that 
outsourcing creates new interest groups, such as the contracting firms and their 
employees, which may increase the demand for those goods or services they sell to the 
government (see, for example, Benson, 1990). Following Olson (1982) and Mueller and 
Murrell (1986), among others, a greater number of interests groups is commonly 
associated with higher government outlays. The general argument here is that interest 
groups pursuing self-interests are able to influence policymakers in order to increase 
public spending for their own benefit. These anticipated influences of newly created 
interest groups as a result of implementing outsourcing policies may undermine, again, 
any overall expenditure reductions.  
Finally, it has also been argued that potential cost savings and efficiency gains 
derived from outsourcing may not lead to lower government spending because of negative 
externalities associated with outsourcing policies, which may impose costs on other 
government organizations (Boyne, 1998a). For instance, if cost reductions and efficiency 
gains are a result of employing fewer staff (Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1996), this might 
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imply that extra costs due to unemployment benefits may eventually outweigh any 
savings resulting from staff reductions, since those reductions generally affect unskilled 
workers who may have more difficulties finding alternative jobs elsewhere (Boyne, 
1998a). 
Following all these lines of argument, it is possible that, though retaining the 
theoretical assumptions that competition and ownership lead to cost reductions in those 
services subject to competition and the discipline of private markets, outsourcing may not 
lead to lower spending in the government system as a whole. If true, this undermines the 
central justification used to promote outsourcing, making the policy much less attractive 
for taxpaying citizens, especially since outsourcing may augment the risk of service 
quality deterioration (Florio, 2014). In sum, economic theory seems to provide a valuable 
framework for assessing the impact of outsourcing on aggregate government expenditure, 
but theoretical predictions are mixed. The theoretical impact of outsourcing is therefore 
indeterminate and requires empirical investigation.  
 
3. Methodology 
To assess the outsourcing effects on public sector spending we use an unbalanced panel 
of 25 EU countries from 1990 to 2011. The following subsections include a description 
of the variables used in the analysis, main trends of government spending and government 
outsourcing, and the empirical specification. 
3.1 Data and variables 
We classified here the main variables into three categories; public expenditures, 
outsourcing indicator, and a set of control variables.  
Public Sector Spending 
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The dependent variable analysed is central government expenditures, measured by the 
ratio of total central government spending as a share of GDP. Figure 1 shows the main 
trends on public expenditures for each country. On average, the size of the public sector 
at the central level is substantially smaller in federal countries such as Germany and 
Spain, and also in some post-communist Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries 
such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.  Regarding the evolution of central government 
expenditures, different patterns can be seen.  Data is complete for 10 countries, stretching 
across 1990-20113 whilst, between 1995 and 2011, we have data for all 25.  Looking at 
this group of 10 countries, seven of them reduced expenditure between the period 1990-
2011, led by Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium, whilst Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark 
and the UK, continued to grow. Looking now at the 25 countries across 1995 to 2011, 
central government size decreased 2.43 percentage points across the whole period, with 
the Czech Republic, Sweden, Slovakia and Italy declining the most. However, there is a 
group of eight countries whose central expenditures slightly increased during the period 
under study, particularly Cyprus (see Figure 1).  
 





The explanatory variable of interest is the percentage of central government spending that 
is allocated to non-government contractors. More specifically, outsourcing can be defined 
as the production of public goods and services by agents other than government 
                                                          
3 Data for Germany starts in 1991. 
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employees (Minicucci & Donahue, 2004). Governments can outsource the production of 
public goods and services in two main ways: they can either purchase goods and services 
from the private sector or non-governmental organizations in order to include them in 
their own production chain (termed in the SNA "intermediate consumption"), or they can 
hire a company to directly provide public goods and services to the final consumer or 
citizen, termed in the SNA "social transfers in kind via market producers" (OECD, 2011). 
Our outsourcing indicator is based on the OECD (2011)4 “government outsourcing 
indicator” and is constructed using the Eurostat "Government revenue, expenditure and 
main aggregates" database, as the sum of intermediate consumption5 plus social transfers 
in kind via market producers6 as a share of final government consumption7. 
Mathematically and following the European Commission (EC) notation: 
 




Figure 2 shows the main trends related to government outsourcing. Data is 
available for 12 countries from 1990 to 2011 and all 25 from 1995 onwards. Between 
1995 and 2011, central government outsourcing increased across all countries at an 
average of 1.74 %, 
Countries with higher outsourcing ratios across this period are, on average, the 
UK, the Netherlands and Sweden, all of them showing averaged outsourcing ratios of 
about 50% of final government consumption. Those countries with lower averaged 
                                                          
4 Following Pollitt (2013), one of the best sources of official data about government reforms is the OECD’s annual 
publication Government at a glance, which has been frequently cited and used both by governments and academic 
studies. 
5  Intermediate Consumption is labeled by the European Commission (2011) as P2. 
6 According to the European Commission (2011) Social transfers in kind via market producers are labeled as D.6311 
+ D.63121 + D63131. 
7 Government final consumption is the sum of government consumption of labor, goods, services and fixed and fixed 
capital, labeled as P3 (European Commission, 2011). 
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outsourcing ratios are Italy (19.16%) and Luxembourg (23.89%). Regarding the evolution 
of central government outsourcing, though it increased, on average, between 1995 and 
2011, there are substantial variations among countries; while countries such as Germany, 
Portugal, Ireland, Latvia and the Netherlands show — by far — the largest increases in 
this period, other countries such as Estonia, Lithuania and Poland significantly decreased 
their outsourcing ratios. This may reflect the fact that reform efforts during early years of 
post-communism transition in CEE countries subsided somewhat from the 2000s 
(Drechsler, 2005). New Public Management (NPM) concepts, such as the implementation 
of outsourcing policies, were predominant at that time in Western European countries and 
international organizations such as the OECD, the IMF and the World Bank, countries 
and organizations from which early transition inspiration was drawn (Randma-Liiv, 
2008). For instance, the Estonian transition was heavily based on NPM concepts but, 
today, Estonia seems to belong to the “strong opposers” to NPM-style reforms (Nemec, 
2010, p.34). However, NPM-reform patterns —as regards content and timing — were not 
the same in all CEE countries (Bouckaert, Nakrošis, & Nemec, 2011). For example, our 
data suggest that, in Latvia, outsourcing ratios started to grow from the 2000s, which 
confirms the view that NPM-style reforms were implemented in the later reform phases 
in Latvia (Bouckaert et al., 2011, p.18).  
 




Following the literature on determinants of public sector size, the following variables are 
included as control variables. First, to control for underlying economic trends, our 
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extended models include the real GDP per capita growth and real GDP per capita, which 
may take Wagner`s Law (Wagner, 1911) into account, and the unemployment rate, which 
may control — alongside with GDP growth and GPD per capita — for the general 
macroeconomic environment. Second, we include three demographic variables which 
may control for the effect of demographics and economies of scale in the demand for 
public expenditure and provision of public services: the dependency ratio, which is the 
population under 14 years old plus the population over 65 years old, as a share of the 
population between 15 and 64 years old; an urbanity index, measured by the urban 
population as a share of the total population, and the population density. Third, we include 
a set of institutional and political variables which may affect public spending: an index 
of political fragmentation and the ideology of the ruling party. First, to account for the 
potential effect of political fragmentation we include a Herfindahl index of government 
concentration; building on the seminal work of Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) 
and Shepsle and Weingast (1981) on common pool problems in policy making, the 
literature related to public spending determinants have devoted considerable attention to 
the idea that political fragmentation affects the amount of government spending. Finally, 
to control for the influence of ideology on public spending, we include in our model a 
dummy variable, left majority, which takes a value of 1 if left-wing parties control a clear 
majority of the cabinet posts (over 66.6%)8.  Table 1 sets out the data sources and 
descriptive statistics. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
                                                          
8  Left-wing denotes social democratic parties and political parties to the left of social democrats. For further details 




3.2 Empirical model 
A model to formally test whether government outsourcing leads to lower central 
government spending should relate public expenditures to the share of outsourced 
government activities and other potential determinants of government spending. The 
model can be specified as follows:  
 
 
(2)                                𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾´𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
where y𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the ratio of total expenditure as a share of GDP in country i at time t; 
x𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the itth observation of the outsourcing indicator; Zit the itth observation on P control 
variables, 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 denotes country specific effects; δt represents the specific time effect 
(common to all countries) and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 the remainder disturbance term.  
Our analysis proceeds as follows: To keep the maximum number of observations 
in the sample, we begin with a basic model specification which includes only as 
explanatory variables the outsourcing indicator and country and time specific effects 
(model I). Then, as robustness check, we estimate a model including also the full set of 
control variables (model II).  Since panel data suffer usually from heteroskedasticiy and 
serial correlation issues, which can bias the standard errors and generate inefficiency in 
the coefficient estimates, models I and II are estimated using Beck and Katz's (1995) 
ordinary least squares with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE), and Parks’ (1967) 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimator.  
Next, we address concerns about the potential endogeneity of the outsourcing 
indicator. Some studies suggest the possibility that increased public spending leads to 
increased outsourcing rates (see Pallesen, 2004), which means that our outsourcing 
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indicator might be endogenous due to reverse causality (simultaneity) issues. Moreover, 
since the outsourcing indicator is constructed with fiscal variables, it might be 
simultaneously determined with the public sector size, which is also a fiscal variable. To 
address this endogeneity issue, we propose to complement our estimations with an 
instrumental variable approach using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator.  
 
Finally, following the recent literature on public sector size we estimate a model 
including the lagged dependent variable among the regressors to control for possible 
expenditure dynamics. When estimating dynamic models, it is important to take into 
account that the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error 
correction term may be a source of bias and inconsistency (Nickell, 1981). To overcome 
this, Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
procedure. These authors suggested taking first differences of equation (2) to eliminate 
the individual specific effects, and then instrument the potentially endogenous right-hand 
side variables in the first-differenced equation using levels of the series lagged at least 
two periods. This estimator was originally developed for micro-panels, meaning samples 
with large cross-sectional units and a small number of time periods. In our sample, as 
common to studies using macroeconomic data, neither of the dimensions is large, which 
may affect the consistency of our results. Judson and Owen (1999), in a Monte Carlo 
experiment, found that in macro-panel environments when T≤20 the GMM estimators 
perform relatively well, only outperformed by the corrected Least Squares Dummy 
Variable (LSDVC) estimator derived by Kiviet (1995). The LSDVC estimator performs 
an analytical correction of the LSDV bias in short panels based on an approximation of 
the finite-sample bias (see, Bruno, 2005a; Kiviet, 1995). Monte Carlo evidence supports 
the use of this estimator instead of GMM estimators when working with macro-panels. 
17 
 
In this light, we propose to use this latter estimator while we will make use of the former 
one (GMM) for a robustness check. 
4. Results and Discussion 
Here we present the results of estimating the models presented in the previous section, 
before discussing their policy implications. The estimation results consistently indicate 
that outsourcing has not led, on average, to lower government expenditures at the central 
government level. Table 2 shows PCSE, FGLS and 2SLS estimates’ results from our 
basic model (model I), which estimates government outsourcing effects based only on the 
most basic set of variables, an also our main model (model II), which includes those, a 
priori, important control variables discussed in section 3.1. 
Starting with the analysis without accounting for potential endogeneity issues, 
both models are estimated using PCSE and FGLS procedures. There has been some 
discussion about which estimator is preferable (see, Beck & Katz, 1995; Chen, Lin, & 
Reed, 2010).  However, with our data set these two approaches yield similar results. The 
most important results are the parameter estimates for our outsourcing indicator. Both 
model specifications indicate that there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the outsourcing ratio and government expenditures, the coefficients 
associated with the outsourcing ratio ranging from 0.13 to 0.21 in function of the model 
and the estimator employed.  
These results could be questioned given that the relationship between outsourcing 
and government spending could be merely evidence of causality running from public 
spending to government outsourcing or just because there might be a simultaneous 
determination of both variables. To address these potential endogeneity issues, we also 
report in Table 2 the results using a 2SLS estimator, employing the second and third lags 
of the outsourcing indicator as instruments. Econometrically, the instruments must be 
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sufficiently correlated with the potentially endogenous covariate (relevance criteria), but 
uncorrelated with the error term. In our case, Kleibergen-Paap (KP) under-identification 
and KP weak identification tests suggest that the selected instruments are relevant, and 
Hansen over-identification tests suggest that those instruments are valid (see Table 2). 
The 2SLS estimates of the outsourcing effect are still positive and significant in both 
models. This therefore bolsters our finding that that outsourcing policies have not led, on 
average, to lower government expenditure. 
As for our control variables, PCSE, FGLS and 2SLS estimates report similar 
results. Regarding the variables controlling for economic trends, we find that 
unemployment is positively related to public spending, since an increase in the rate of 
unemployment tends to lead to increased spending on social policies, passive and active 
employment policies, and counter-cyclical fiscal policies.  On the other hand, GDP 
growth is negatively related to public spending, suggesting that when real GDP grows, 
the size of the central government shrink; we do not find, therefore, evidence to support 
Wagner’s (1911) Law for the period and countries under analysis. As regards ideological 
and institutional variables, the coefficient associated with the Herfindalh index of 
government concentration suggest that less fragmented governments are less likely to 
increase government spending during the period under analysis. The coefficient estimates 
of government ideology show that governments controlled by left-wing parties are more 
likely to increase public spending, though this effect does not seem to be statistically 
significant.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
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As a final robustness check, we estimate the dynamic model discussed in section 
3.2. Table 3 reports estimation results for both models using the aforementioned LSDVC9 
and GMM10 estimators; the lagged dependent variable is always significant and takes 
positive values in all model specifications, which shows that government expenditures 
exhibit a dynamic pattern. As regards our main coefficient of interest, the outsourcing 
effect on public expenditures, the estimates are still positive in all model specifications, 
though the LSDVC estimates report slightly lower coefficients (about 0.08).  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
In sum, the results of all estimated models indicate that outsourcing has not led to 
lower government expenditure; moreover, we find evidence that outsourcing actually led, 
on average, to greater public spending at the central government level. What policy 
lessons can be extracted from these findings? Fundamentally, the outsourcing of public 
services – involving the transfer away from government and towards private agents the 
responsibility for producing and delivering public services – was justified principally by 
the ideas that the private sector could do the job more efficiency, generating cost savings 
for governments. For citizens, the benefits were two-fold: they would enjoy better quality 
public services whilst seeing a reduction in their tax contribution. Other potential 
advantages of outsourcing as a consequence of bringing them under private management 
was that competition would render public service providers more efficient, offering more 
choice to citizens, resulting in greater citizen satisfaction. Indeed, a host of studies have 
                                                          
9 LSDVC estimations are computed using the xtlsdvc routine developed by Bruno (2005b), initializing the bias 
correction by the Arellano and Bond estimator.  
10 To avoid estimation bias due to the use of too many instruments (see, Roodman, 2009b), we restrict the instruments 
matrix, exclude time dummies  and use only certain lags of the lagged expenditures covariate instead of all available 




already researched into the consequences of outsourcing as regards its potentially 
negative effects on issues such as: efficiency (Alonso, Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes, 2015b); 
citizen satisfaction with services (Clifton, Díaz-Fuentes and Fernández-Gutiérrez, 2016); 
social welfare (Sclar, 2015) and labour conditions, work-related stress and service quality 
(Hermann and Flecker, 2012). However, few studies had asked the whether the core 
justification for outsourcing – its reduction of government spending – could be confirmed 
empirically. Our results significantly undermine policy-makers’ claims that outsourcing 
entails cost savings, at least, as a generalizable statement.  
How could policy-makers use these findings? Firstly, the findings stress that 
outsourcing should not be promoted unequivocally as always bringing about cost savings. 
Secondly, however, this does not mean outsourcing never reduces public expenditure. 
This research, by analysing the effects of outsourcing at relatively high levels of 
aggregation, obscures the fact that outsourcing may well bring about savings in particular 
countries and sectors, but not in others. Hence, our finding coincides with ongoing 
discussions about the extent to which policy can be applied as one “single recipe” (one-
size-fits-all approach), or, whether policy requires a more nuanced approach, guided by 
the understanding that policy works in particular sectoral/geographical/political 
situations, when a specific and often complex set of conditions are in place (see, Grindle, 
2011; Rodrik, 1996). Given the central justification for outsourcing and our key finding, 
the lesson is that, in order for outsourcing to achieve what its advocates promise - reduced 
government spending - policy-makers must ensure specific preconditions are in place in 
order for outsourcing to deliver these expected savings. In this scenario, policymakers 
can conduct careful cost-benefit analysis, with a particular focus on those costs derived 
from contracts’ drafting, managing and monitoring, negative externalities to other 
government organizations, potential “hold up” issues, and so on; in Prager and Desai’s 
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(1996, p.185) words “contracting out must be implemented with the precision of a 
surgeon's scalpel, not with the brute force of the butcher's cleaver”. 
5. Conclusions  
Policy-makers working across multiple organizations, including the EC, the World Trade 
Organization and the OECD, continue to argue in favour of outsourcing as a means to 
reduce government spending on public services. The ongoing crisis that began in 2008 
has augmented this need of governments to reduce expenditure on public services. 
Though outsourcing advocates insist the policy has a number of advantages such as 
augmented service efficiency and quality, the fundamental justification for outsourcing is 
its stated advantage in reducing government expenditure on public services. However, 
there remains a lack of empirical evidence demonstrating that outsourcing actually led to 
government savings in the scholarship on outsourcing. Though the empirical literature on 
government outsourcing effects is large, the vast majority of the empirical research did 
not take into account whether detected cost savings in particular services were translated 
to the government as a whole.  
In this light, this paper sought to assess whether outsourcing public sector tasks 
actually led to reductions in government expenditure. The empirical findings consistently 
reject our null hypothesis, indicating that outsourcing was not associated with a reduction 
in public sector size at the central government level; in fact, outsourcing policies resulted 
in increased government expenditures. These results call into question the widespread 
assumption that contracting out public service production should result in lower costs or 
savings for governments. As we found overall expenditure actually increases and, given 
we are working at quite an aggregated level, we assume outsourcing sometimes reduces 
costs, but that overall, it does not. The major policy lesson here then is that policy-makers 
require information on the preconditions necessary in order that outsourcing is likely to 
22 
 
generate cost savings, and, indeed, those preconditions where outsourcing is unlikely to 
generate cost savings, using a cost-benefit analysis approach.  
Despite the strengths of the findings, there are limitations of our analysis that offer 
opportunities for further research. In particular, our study design does not allow us to 
precisely identify the mechanisms explaining the positive relationship between 
outsourcing and government spending. Unfortunately, due to the lack of reliable 
indicators it was not possible for us to disentangle those precise mechanisms on this 
occasion. Further quantitative research may help, therefore, to shed light on whether 
transaction costs, fiscal illusion, common pool problems, pressures from interest groups, 
or the existence of negative externalities matter most when explaining our findings. 
For now, though, we can conclude that our study has not contributed empirical 






Alonso, J. M., Clifton, J., & Díaz-Fuentes, D. (2015a). Did new public management 
matter? An empirical analysis of the outsourcing and decentralization effects on 
public sector size. Public Management Review, 17(5), 643-660.  
Alonso, J. M., Clifton, J., & Díaz-Fuentes, D. (2015b). The impact of New Public 
Management on efficiency: An analysis of Madrid's hospitals. Health Policy, 
119(3), 333-340. 
Anderson, D., Hunt, B., & Snudden, S. (2014). Fiscal consolidation in the euro area: 
How much pain can structural reforms ease? Journal of Policy Modeling, 36(5), 
785-799. 
Andrews, R., Boyne, G., & Walker, R. (2011). Dimensions of publicness and 
organizational performance: A review of the evidence. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 21(suppl 3), i301-i319.  
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte 
Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. The Review of 
Economic Studies, 58(2), 277-297.  
Armingeon, K., Careja, R., Knöpfel, L., Weisstanner, D., Engler, S., Potolidis, P., & 
Gerber, M. (2013). Comparative Political Data Set III 1990-2011. Bern: Institute 
of Political Science, University of Berne. 
Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P., & Walsh, P. (2001). New tools in 
comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions. The World 
Bank Economic Review, 15(1), 165-176. 
24 
 
Beck, N., & Katz, J. N. (1995). What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-
section data. American Political Science Review, 89(03), 634-647.  
Bel, G., & Warner, M. (2015). Factors explaining inter-municipal cooperation in service 
delivery: a meta-regression analysis. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 19(2), 
91-115.  
Bel, G., Fageda, X., & Warner, M. E. (2010). Is private production of public services 
cheaper than public production? A meta-regression analysis of solid waste and 
water services. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 29(3), 553-577.  
Benson, B. L. (1990). The enterprise of law: Justice without the state. San Francisco: 
Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy. 
Boardman, A. E., Vining, A. R., & Weimer, D. L. (2016). The long-run effects of 
privatization on productivity: Evidence from Canada. Journal of Policy Modeling. 
Ahead-of-print. 
Bouckaert, G., Nakrošis, V., & Nemec, J. (2011). Public administration and 
management reforms in CEE: Main trajectories and results. NISPAcee Journal of 
Public Administration and Policy, 4(1), 9-29.  
Boycko, M., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1996). A theory of privatisation. The 
Economic Journal, 106(435), 309-319.  
Boyne, G. A. (1998a). Bureaucratic theory meets reality: Public choice and service 
contracting in US local government. Public Administration Review, 58(6), 474-484.  
25 
 
Boyne, G. A. (1998b). Competitive tendering in local government: A review of theory 
and evidence. Public Administration, 76(4), 695-712.  
Brown, T. L., & Potoski, M. (2005). Transaction costs and contracting: The practitioner 
perspective. Public Performance & Management Review, 28(3), 326-351.  
Bruno, G. S. (2005a). Approximating the bias of the LSDV estimator for dynamic 
unbalanced panel data models. Economics Letters, 87(3), 361-366.  
Bruno, G. S. (2005b). XTLSDVC: Stata module to estimate bias corrected LSDV 
dynamic panel data models. Statistical Software Components,  
Buchanan, J., & Wagner, R. (1977). Democracy in deficit Acad. Press. 
Chen, X., Lin, S., & Reed, W. R. (2010). A Monte Carlo evaluation of the efficiency of 
the PCSE estimator. Applied Economics Letters, 17(1), 7-10.  
Clifton, J., Díaz-Fuentes, D., & Fernández-Gutiérrez, M. (2016). Public infrastructure 
services in the European Union: Challenges for territorial cohesion. Regional 
Studies, 50(2), 358-373. 
Clifton, J., Comín, F., & Díaz-Fuentes, D. (2006). Privatizing public enterprises in the 
European Union 1960–2002: Ideological, pragmatic, inevitable? Journal of 
European Public Policy, 13(5), 736-756.  
Davies, D. G. (1971). The efficiency of public versus private firms, the case of 
Australia's two airlines. Journal of Law and Economics, 14(1), 149-165.  
Domberger, S., & Jensen, P. (1997). Contracting out by the public sector: Theory, 
evidence, prospects. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 13(4), 67-78.  
26 
 
Domberger, S., & Rimmer, S. (1994). Competitive tendering and contracting in the 
public sector: A survey. International Journal of the Economics of Business, 1(3), 
439-453.  
Drechsler, W. (2005). The re-emergence of “Weberian” public administration after the 
fall of new public management: The central and eastern European perspective. 
Administrative Culture, (06), 94-108.  
European Commission. (2011). Manual on sources and methods for the compilation of 
COFOG statistics classification of the functions of government (COFOG). 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. 
Ferré, M. (2008). Fiscal policy coordination in the EMU. Journal of Policy Modeling, 
30(2), 221-235. 
Florio, M. (2014). Contemporary public enterprises: innovation, accountability, 
governance. Journal of Economic Policy Reform. 17(3), 201-2018. 
Girth, A. M., Hefetz, A., Johnston, J. M., & Warner, M. E. (2012). Outsourcing public 
service delivery: Management responses in non-competitive markets. Public 
Administration Review, 72(6), 887-900.  
Grindle, M. S. (2011). Governance reform: The new analytics of next steps. 
Governance, 24(3), 415-418.  
Hefetz, A., & Warner, M. E. (2012). Contracting or public delivery? The importance of 
service, market, and management characteristics. Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, 22(2), 289-317.  
27 
 
Hermann, C. and Flecker, J. (2012). Privatization of Public Services. Impacts for 
Employment, Working Conditions, and Service Quality in Europe. Routledge: New 
York, London, 213pp.  
Hodge, G. A. (2000). Privatization: An international review of performance. Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press. 
Jensen, P. H., & Stonecash, R. E. (2005). Incentives and the efficiency of public sector-
outsourcing contracts. Journal of Economic Surveys, 19(5), 767-787.  
Judson, R. A., & Owen, A. L. (1999). Estimating dynamic panel data models: A guide 
for macroeconomists. Economics Letters, 65(1), 9-15.  
Kiviet, J. F. (1995). On bias, inconsistency, and efficiency of various estimators in 
dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), 53-78.  
Minicucci, S., & Donahue, J. D. (2004). A simple estimation method for aggregate 
government outsourcing. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 23(3), 489-
507.  
Mueller, D. C., & Murrell, P. (1986). Interest groups and the size of government. Public 
Choice, 48(2), 125-145.  
Nemec, J. (2010). New public management and its implementation in CEE: What do we 
know and where do we go? NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and 
Policy, 3(1), 31-52.  
Nickell, S. (1981). Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Econometrica: Journal 
of the Econometric Society, 49(6), 1417-1426.  
28 
 
Niskanen, W. A. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago, Ill.: 
Aldine. 
OECD. (2007).  Competition Policy and Concessions. Paris: Policy Brief. 
OECD. (2011). Government at a glance 2011. Paris: OECD Publishing.  
OECD. (2013). Government at a glance 2013. Paris: OECD publishing.  
Olson, M. (1982). The rise and decline of nations: Economic growth, stagflation, and 
social rigidities. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Pallesen, T. (2004). A political perspective on contracting out: The politics of good 
times. Experiences from Danish local governments. Governance, 17(4), 573-587.  
Parks, R. W. (1967). Efficient estimation of a system of regression equations when 
disturbances are both serially and contemporaneously correlated. Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, 62(318), 500-509.  
Payton, S. B., & Kennedy, S. S. (2013). Fiscal magic outsourcing and the taxing power. 
State and Local Government Review, 45(3), 189-195.  
Pollitt, C. (2013). Back in the OECD… an oblique comment on the World Bank’s 
Better Results from Public Sector Institutions. International Review of 
Administrative Sciences, 79(3), 406-412. 
Prager, J., & Desai, S. (1996). Privatizing local government operations: Lessons from 
federal contracting out methodology. Public Productivity & Management Review, 
20(2), 185-203.  
29 
 
Randma-Liiv, T. (2008). New public management versus the neo-weberian state in 
central and eastern Europe. The NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and 
Policy, 1(2), 49-71.  
Rodrik, D. (1996). Understanding economic policy reform. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 34(1), 9-41.  
Roodman, D. (2009a). How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system 
GMM in Stata. Stata Journal, 9(1), 86-136.  
Roodman, D. (2009b). A note on the theme of too many instruments*. Oxford Bulletin 
of Economics and Statistics, 71(1), 135-158.  
Ruiz-Villaverde, A., Picazo-Tadeo, A. J., & González-Gómez, F. (2015). The ‘social 
choice’of privatising urban water services: A case study of Madrid in Spain. 
Journal of Policy Modeling, 37(4), 616-629. 
Sappington, D. E., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1987). Privatization, information and incentives. 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 6(4), 567-585.  
Savas, E. S. (2000). Privatization and public-private partnerships. New Jersey: 
Chatham House. 
Sclar, E. (2015). The political economics of investment utopia: public-private 
partnerships for urban infrastructure finance. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 
18(1), 1-15. 
Shepsle, K. A., & Weingast, B. R. (1981). Political preferences for the pork barrel: A 
generalization. American Journal of Political Science, 25(1), 96-111.  
30 
 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1994). The politics of market socialism. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 8(2), 165-176.  
Vaughan-Whitehead, D. (2013). Public sector shock in Europe: Between structural 
reforms and quantitative adjustment. In D. Vaughan-Whitehead (Ed.), Public 
Sector shock. The impact of policy retrenchment in Europe. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar. 
Wagner, A. (1911). Staat in nationalokonomischer hinsicht. Handwörterbuch der 
staatswissenscha en. Jena: Fischer. 
Wagner, R. E. (1976). Revenue structure, fiscal illusion, and budgetary choice. Public 
Choice, 25(1), 45-61.  
Warner, M. E., & Hefetz, A. (2008). Managing markets for public service: The role of 
mixed public–private delivery of city services. Public Administration Review, 
68(1), 155-166.  
Warner, M. E., & Clifton, J. (2014). Marketisation, public services and the city: The 
potential for polanyian counter movements. Cambridge Journal of Regions, 
Economy and Society, 7(1), 45-61.  
Weingast, B. R., Shepsle, K. A., & Johnsen, C. (1981). The political economy of 
benefits and costs: A neoclassical approach to distributive politics. The Journal of 
Political Economy, 89(4), 642-664.  
Williamson, O. E. (1991). Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete 
structural alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(2), 269-296.  
31 
 
Williamson, O. E. (1999). Public and private bureaucracies: A transaction cost 









Figure 2. Central government outsourcing as a share of final consumption 
 
 




Table 1. Descriptive statistics and data sources 
Variable Source Obs. Mean Std. Dev. VIF 
Central gov. Size Eurostat 476 29.770 7.126 
 
Outsourcing ratio Own calculations based 
on Eurostat data 
487 37.295 10.076 1.15 
Unemployment rate Eurostat/OECD 479 8.516 4.029 1.46 
GDP per capita Eurostat 489 20631.49 12419.15 2.05 
GDP growth Eurostat 472 2.254 4.118 1.09 
Urban population World Bank 550 71.914 11.663 2.47 
Dependency ratio World Bank 550 48.734 3.781 1.78 
Population Density World Bank 550 175.706 234.417 1.86 
Left majority CPDS III  550 0.244 0.430 1.25 
Gov. concentration DPI 536 0.644 0.262 1.50 
Notes: VIF refers to the Variance Inflation Factor. Variables expressed in percentage points except GDP per 
capita (euro per inhabitant), Population density (inhabitants per square kilometer), Left majority (dummy) and 
Government concentration (Herfindahl Index). Variables constructed from data collected from five different data 
sources: Eurostat’s “Annual Government Finance Statistics” database, OECD’s Economic Outlook nº 93, World 
Bank’s ‘World Development Indicators’ database, Comparative Political Dataset III 1990-2011 (Armingeon et al., 






Table 2. Estimates of outsourcing effects on central government spending 
 
Model I Model II  
PCSE FGLE 2SLS PCSE FGLE 2SLS 
Outsourcing ratio 0.198*** 0.129*** 0.269*** 0.208*** 0.149*** 0.222***  
(0.047) (0.032) (0.066) (0.049) (0.033) (0.076) 
Unemployment rate 
   
0.222*** 0.193*** 0.343***     
(0.081) (0.056) (0.081) 
GDP per capita 
   
0.000 0.000 0.000     
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth 
   
-0.142*** -0.101*** -0.268***     
(0.054) (0.032) (0.065) 
Urban population 
   
0.116 0.059 0.247**     
(0.122) (0.119) (0.122) 
Dependency ratio 
   
0.144 0.077 -0.064     
(0.124) (0.102) (0.099) 
Population Density 
   
0.000 0.009 0.010     
(0.028) (0.025) (0.022) 
Left majority 
   
0.329 0.204 0.641*     
(0.285) (0.303) (0.362) 
Gov. concentration 
   
-2.726** -2.346*** -3.197***     
(1.102) (0.842) (1.215) 
Observations 476 476 408 438 438 394 
Groups 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 



















Notes: The asterisks ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Robust 





Table 3. Dynamic estimates of outsourcing effects on central government spending 
 
Model I Model II  
LSDVC GMM LSDVC GMM 
Gov. Spendingt-1  0.713*** 0.861*** 0.679*** 0.706***  
(0.040) (0.075) (0.043) (0.154) 
Outsourcing ratio 0.083*** 0.211*** 0.082** 0.248***  
(0.029) (0.081) (0.034) (0.062) 
Unemployment rate 
  
0.041 0.014    
(0.055) (0.092) 
GDP per capita 
  
























-1.906** -0.284    
(0.928) (0.919) 
Observations 451 426 426 401 
Groups 25 25 25 25 
Country effects Yes No Yes No 
















Notes: The asterisks ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Robust 
standard errors reported in parentheses. LSDVC standard errors are obtained through 5000 bootstrap replications.  
LSDVC bias correction initialized by Arellano and Bond estimator. For GMM estimates the size of the instrument 
matrix is restricted in both models using the collapse option in Stata command xtabond2 (Roodman, 2009a), and 
number of lags are set between 2 and 14 in model II. 
 
 
 
 
